Global economic uncertainty is once again on the rise. High debt levels, pressure on the real estate sector, geopolitical tensions and persistently high financing costs are raising questions about the risk of another financial crisis on the scale of 2008.
To assess the risk of a new crisis, it is essential to understand exactly what led to the collapse of eighteen years ago. The 2008 financial crisis was not a single, homogeneous event – it was the result of several specific factors that occurred simultaneously at that time and appear in different configurations today. Above all, the epicentre of the crisis was the United States, and more specifically the subprime market – mortgage loans granted to borrowers with low creditworthiness. For years, from the late 1990s to the mid‑2000s, low interest rates from the Federal Reserve (the fed funds rate fell to 1 percent in 2003‑2004) and easy access to credit fuelled a rapid rise in residential real estate prices. Banks and financial institutions, driven by profit maximisation, granted loans without proper credit checks, then packaged them into complex securitisation instruments such as CDOs (collateralised debt obligations) and MBS (mortgage‑backed securities), which spread risk across the entire financial system.
When US home prices began to fall in 2006‑2007 and rising interest rates (the fed funds rate was raised to 5.25 percent in mid‑2006) increased the number of delinquent borrowers, the value of those instruments collapsed. Banks, investment funds and insurers that held massive amounts of toxic assets on their balance sheets lost liquidity. The failure of the investment bank Lehman Brothers in September 2008 was the culmination – it triggered a domino effect, a complete freeze of interbank markets, and then a global recession that in 2009 slashed the GDP of most developed economies by several percentage points. The unemployment rate in the United States reached 10 percent, and in Spain and Greece exceeded 25 percent.
Today’s situation differs from that period on several fundamental levels. First, the banking sector in most developed economies is much better capitalised than before 2008. The post‑crisis regulations, notably Basel III, increased bank capital requirements (minimum Tier 1 capital from 2 percent before the crisis to 6‑8.5 percent today, with additional counter‑cyclical buffers) and introduced regular stress tests designed to identify weak points in the financial system before they materialise. Second, the residential mortgage market in the United States and Europe is far more controlled. In the US, fixed‑rate mortgages with stricter underwriting dominate, and the subprime market has largely been eliminated. Third, central banks have accumulated experience in responding to liquidity crises – the interventions of the European Central Bank and the Federal Reserve in 2020 and 2023 were much faster and more decisive than in 2008. This does not mean the global economy is risk‑free – it simply means that the sources of potential crisis have shifted to other areas.
Global debt has become the biggest structural challenge
Since the 2008 financial crisis, the global economy has operated in an environment of exceptionally easy monetary policy. After interest rates were cut to near zero in 2008‑2009, central banks in the United States, Europe, Japan and the United Kingdom kept them at historically low levels for more than a decade, often below 1 percent. In the euro area, rates were even negative. In addition, quantitative easing programmes were launched, under which central banks bought government and corporate bonds worth trillions of dollars, euros and yen, flooding the financial system with cheap money.
Governments, corporations and households used this period of easy access to capital to increase debt. According to the International Monetary Fund, total global public and private debt reached a record high of about 250 percent of world GDP in 2024 – an increase of about 30 percentage points compared to the pre‑pandemic level. Public sector debt grew particularly sharply – the pandemic forced governments to launch huge relief programmes, largely financed by issuing new debt. In the United States, public debt exceeded 120 percent of GDP, in France 110 percent, in Italy 140 percent, and in Japan – over 250 percent of GDP. Poland, despite a relatively lower scale, also saw its public debt rise to about 55 percent of GDP in 2025, up from about 45 percent before the pandemic.
However, the problem is not only the level of debt itself, but also the fact that its structure and servicing conditions have changed dramatically after the sharp interest rate hikes in 2022‑2024. When major central banks, reacting to inflation that in 2022 reached 9 percent in the United States and 10 percent in Europe, raised interest rates at a pace unseen in forty years (the Federal Reserve raised the fed funds rate from 0.25 percent in March 2022 to 5.5 percent in mid‑2023, and the European Central Bank from -0.5 percent to 4.5 percent), the cost of debt servicing surged for all categories of borrowers. Many companies and households that had taken out variable‑rate or short‑term loans during the period of low rates suddenly faced much higher instalments. For highly leveraged, low‑margin businesses, a 4‑5 percentage point increase in financing costs can push them from net profit to loss. Some analysts suggest that in certain sectors, especially commercial real estate and smaller industrial enterprises, this process is already advanced, though its full effects may only become visible over the next two to three years.
Commercial real estate once again raises concerns
Although the risk of a systemic subprime‑like mortgage crisis that was the main transmission channel of the 2008 crisis is now much lower, the commercial real estate sector in the United States and parts of Europe is under pressure that evokes earlier warning cycles. Commercial real estate includes office buildings, shopping malls, hotels, warehouses and industrial facilities. The office and retail segments are currently the most vulnerable, for both cyclical reasons (high interest rates) and structural reasons (changes in work patterns).
High interest rates have lowered commercial real estate valuations. Because valuations are based on discounted future rental cash flows, a 4‑5 percentage point increase in discount rates has translated into a 20‑40 percent drop in market values, depending on location, quality and building class. For property owners and investment funds that often finance themselves with short‑maturity debt (typical commercial loans mature in 5‑7 years), falling valuations combined with higher refinancing costs create a trap. If the property value falls below the outstanding debt, the borrower must either pay the difference from his own funds or hand the property back to the lender (a strategic default). In the United States, about $1.2 trillion of commercial real estate loans were scheduled to mature in 2025‑2027, and a significant portion required refinancing at much higher interest rates.
An additional structural factor reducing demand for office space is the spread of remote and hybrid work, which has become entrenched after the COVID‑19 pandemic. In the largest US metropolitan areas – San Francisco, New York, Los Angeles, Chicago – office occupancy rates have fallen to 70‑80 percent, and in some Class B and C buildings even below 60 percent. In Europe, in cities such as London, Frankfurt, Paris and Warsaw, the trend is similar, though less dramatic. Falling office demand translates into lower rents, longer vacancy periods, and less investor willingness to commit capital to this segment. Shopping centres and retail parks are also struggling, mainly due to the rise of online sales, although this process began before the pandemic.
Is the commercial real estate risk large enough to trigger a systemic crisis on the scale of 2008? Most analysts are sceptical. First, banks’ exposure to this sector is much smaller than their exposure to the residential market before 2008. Many commercial loans have been securitised and moved to investment funds, insurance companies or pension funds, rather than staying on bank balance sheets. Even a significant drop in values would spread losses across many different investors, not concentrate them in systemically important banks. Second, the scale of the problem is smaller in macroeconomic terms – commercial real estate valuations in the US and Europe, despite declines, are still higher than before the pandemic in many locations, and the sector is not as tightly interwoven with the rest of the economy as the residential market was in 2008. A slow, painful adjustment – bankruptcies of some funds and developers, properties taken over by creditors, and then a gradual price adjustment to the new reality – is much more likely than a sudden collapse of the entire financial system.
Geopolitics increases instability and complicates economic policy
One of the most important differences between 2008 and the mid‑2020s is the scale and nature of geopolitical tensions. In 2008, despite wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the world operated in a relatively stable international environment based on post‑Cold War US dominance and growing economic integration with China. Today the situation is dramatically different. The war in Ukraine, now in its fifth year, has turned into a high‑intensity war of attrition, destabilising energy, food and commodity markets globally. Tensions between the United States and China involve not only trade and tariffs but also technology, space, Taiwan and the South China Sea. The Middle East crisis, exacerbated after the Hamas attack on Israel in October 2023 and subsequent interventions, continues to affect oil prices and the security of shipping lanes, especially through the Red Sea and the Suez Canal.
These tensions increase economic instability in three main ways. First, they directly affect commodity prices. Rises in oil, natural gas, metals and agricultural prices in response to armed conflicts or the threat of escalation complicate central banks’ inflation‑fighting efforts. In 2025, Brent crude fluctuated in the $80‑120 per barrel range, and natural gas prices in Europe remained three times higher than before 2021, despite falling from the record levels of 2022. Second, geopolitical tensions affect investor expectations and risk appetite. In periods of heightened uncertainty, companies postpone investment and consumers cut back on durable goods spending, slowing economic growth and potentially leading to a self‑fulfilling recession. Third, the reorganisation of global supply chains in response to geopolitical risks – a process described as friend‑shoring, reshoring, near‑shoring or decoupling – means higher production costs. Moving production from China to Vietnam, Mexico, India or Poland is often more expensive due to smaller scale, lower automation and higher logistics costs. In the longer term, these additional costs translate into higher core inflation and slower productivity growth. The global economy is entering a period where the model of globalisation based on cost minimisation without regard to geopolitical risk is coming to an end. This is a historic shift that will shape the business environment for at least the next decade.
Europe remains particularly vulnerable to converging adverse trends
For Europe, the economic risk is greater than for the United States or China, mainly because of the combination of high energy costs, weaker productivity growth, rising external competition and limited fiscal space. European industry, especially in Germany, Italy, France and Poland, is struggling with energy costs that – despite falling from the record levels of 2022 – are still much higher than in the United States (where natural gas prices are four times lower thanks to domestic shale deposits) and higher than in China. For the chemical, steel, glass, ceramics, battery and electric vehicle industries, a difference of 3‑5 euro cents per kilowatt‑hour in energy costs can determine the profitability of entire sectors.
An additional challenge for Europe is growing competition from the United States, which through the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) offers huge subsidies for the production of green technologies – including battery cells, solar panels, hydrogen electrolysers and electric vehicles. Some investments that would have gone to Europe a few years ago are now choosing the United States. A case in point is battery and battery materials production, where US subsidies are simpler, larger and more accessible than European ones, which are often fragmented between the European Commission, national governments and development banks. Europe must therefore simultaneously finance the energy transition (estimated at about €1.1 trillion by 2030 under the updated National Energy and Climate Plan), increase defence spending (after the US decision to withdraw some security guarantees) and maintain industrial competitiveness against lower energy costs and higher subsidies across the Atlantic. This is a fiscal and investment challenge on a scale unseen since post‑WWII reconstruction.
For Germany, the largest European economy, the situation is particularly difficult. The automotive industry is suffering from a technological lag in electromobility and rising competition from Chinese manufacturers (BYD, Geely, SAIC), who have mastered the production of low‑cost electric vehicles. The chemical and machinery industries are losing competitiveness because of energy costs. Exports, which for decades were the driver of German GDP growth, are weakening due to global trade slowdown and geopolitical tensions. In 2025, German GDP grew by only 0.3 percent, and forecasts for 2026‑2027 assume growth of 0.7 and 1.2 percent respectively – significantly lower than the euro area average and much lower than the United States (projected 2.5 percent in 2026). Germany is no longer the growth engine of Europe – and in a highly integrated economy like the European Union, a slowdown in the largest member state drags down the others, including Poland.
Poland is in a better condition than during previous crises
Compared to many European countries, Poland is in a relatively better position than during the 2008 crisis or the COVID‑19 pandemic. There are several reasons for this. First, the Polish economy is more diversified today than it was eighteen years ago. Although industry’s share of GDP remains high (about 25 percent), it is no longer dominant; sectors such as business services (BPO/SSC), modern IT services, logistics, e‑commerce and financial services have expanded. Second, Poland has attracted significant foreign investment in recent years in the battery sector, electromobility, semiconductor production and data centres, creating new jobs and increasing resilience to cyclical fluctuations. Third, the Polish banking sector is more stable than in many other European countries – the non‑performing loan (NPL) ratio remains around 5‑6 percent, banks are well capitalised, and exposure to risky financial instruments is limited. In 2025, the Polish Financial Supervision Authority assessed that the banking system passed stress tests positively, even under a scenario of a 5 percent GDP drop and a rise in unemployment to 12 percent.
At the same time, the Polish economy remains heavily dependent on the economic situation in Germany and the European Union as a whole. About 75 percent of Polish exports go to EU countries, and Germany is the most important trading partner, accounting for about 25 percent of exports. A slowdown in Germany directly translates into lower demand for Polish industrial goods – auto parts, machinery, furniture, chemicals and food products. In 2025, Polish exports to Germany grew by only 1.2 percent, whereas in 2021 the growth rate was 15 percent. High interest rates, which remain at 5.75 percent (NBP reference rate in May 2026), constrain investment and credit activity, and also affect the residential real estate market. In 2025, the number of housing loans granted fell by 30 percent year‑on‑year, while property prices, despite a lower number of transactions, remained relatively stable due to limited supply of new homes and high construction material costs.
Unemployment in Poland remains low at about 5 percent (according to Statistics Poland for Q1 2026), one of the best results in the European Union and significantly lower than during the 2008‑2009 crisis, when it reached nearly 10 percent. Low unemployment supports domestic demand – private consumption, despite higher credit costs, is growing at 2‑3 percent per year, partly offsetting weaker exports. Inflation, according to the NBP’s March 2026 projection, should stay in the range of 1.6‑2.9 percent in 2026, i.e. within the inflation target (1.5‑3.5 percent with a central target of 2.5 percent), which leaves room for possible interest rate cuts in 2027 if the economic situation worsens further. Nevertheless, Poland is not completely immune to global and European turmoil. A deep recession in Germany or the United States would be felt through lower exports, a halt in foreign direct investment and reduced EU fund inflows (the next EU budget perspective after 2027 is still being negotiated and may be less favourable to Poland than previous ones). The most likely scenario for Poland in the coming years is GDP growth of 2‑3 percent per year – slower than in 2021‑2022, but faster than in most Western European countries – with continued pressure on public finances and a gradual, rather than abrupt, adjustment to the new geopolitical and energy reality.
Stagnation is more likely than a sudden crash
In summary, the current situation does not directly resemble the conditions that led to the sharp, systemic collapse of the financial sector in 2008. The main differences are fundamental: banks are better capitalised and regulated, there is no subprime mortgage bubble of comparable scale, and central banks and governments have more experience and tools to respond to liquidity crises. This means that the risk of a sudden, uncontrolled crash in which a systemically important bank fails and triggers a cascade is much lower than in 2008. The 2023 failures of Silicon Valley Bank and Credit Suisse were contained relatively quickly, without spreading to the entire financial system – evidence of the greater resilience of today’s regulatory and crisis‑management frameworks.
Far more likely than a sudden crash is a prolonged period of slower economic growth, higher financing costs, greater geopolitical instability and a gradual restructuring of the economic model. The global economy is entering a phase in which the three main drivers of growth over the past thirty years are coming to an end: cheap money (interest rates have returned to historical levels, and quantitative easing has been reversed), cheap energy (gas and oil prices are structurally higher, and the energy transition requires massive investment) and full‑blown globalisation (supply chains are fragmenting, and international trade is becoming more costly and less predictable). Europe, because of its geographical location, industrial structure and demographic challenges, will feel this shift particularly acutely. Poland, although in better condition than during previous crises, will not remain unaffected.
