The United States could supply Iran with nuclear fuel in exchange for Tehran abandoning its uranium enrichment program, US Energy Secretary Chris Wright said. Washington is offering a solution that would allow Iran to maintain access to nuclear energy without producing enriched uranium itself, while at the same time putting the future of the country’s centrifuge program at the center of the dispute.
The proposal comes at a time when the Iranian nuclear program remains one of the most serious points of conflict between Tehran, Washington and Israel. Wright said the United States could provide Iran with nuclear fuel from outside the country if Tehran abandoned uranium enrichment.
“Możemy dostarczać Iranowi paliwo” powiedział Chris Wright, sekretarz energii USA.
Such an arrangement would separate the production of nuclear fuel from its use. Iran could continue operating civilian nuclear facilities, but would no longer need to maintain its own uranium enrichment infrastructure. This is precisely the area that Washington and Israel consider the most sensitive part of the Iranian nuclear program, because the same enrichment technology can be used to produce fuel for civilian reactors or uranium enriched to weapons grade.
The US administration is therefore seeking to create a system in which Iran would receive the material needed to operate its civilian nuclear facilities while giving up the technology that allows it to produce enriched uranium domestically. For Tehran, the central issue would be whether such an arrangement could provide sufficient guarantees that fuel deliveries would continue over the long term.
Iran faces a choice between negotiations and confrontation
Wright also warned that Iran could choose a completely different path. Tehran could continue developing a clandestine nuclear weapons program, but in that case it would risk another confrontation with the United States.
“Ale mogą też nadal utrzymywać tajny, ukryty pod ziemią i maskowany kłamstwami program budowy broni jądrowej, narażając się na konfrontację z amerykańskimi siłami zbrojnymi, które zagwarantują, że nie dojdzie do jej powstania” powiedział Wright.
The dispute is particularly difficult because the United States and Israel are not demanding only greater transparency from Iran. Their position is that Tehran should dismantle its centrifuge program and stop enriching uranium altogether. Centrifuges are high speed machines that separate uranium isotopes and are essential to the production of both civilian nuclear fuel and material that can be used for nuclear weapons.
For Washington, eliminating Iran’s domestic enrichment capability would therefore remove one of the most important elements of the country’s potential ability to rapidly rebuild a nuclear weapons program. For Iran, however, giving up enrichment would mean abandoning a technology that Tehran has repeatedly described as a legitimate part of its civilian nuclear program.
Wright said the United States could instead supply Iran with the required fuel from abroad.
“Możemy dostarczać (Iranowi) paliwo (…)” powiedział sekretarz energii USA.
“Mogliby ponownie dołączyć do wspólnoty narodów i zapewnić swojemu społeczeństwu pokój oraz dobrobyt” dodał Wright.
IAEA inspectors still cannot verify where Iran’s enriched uranium is
The biggest problem for any such agreement is verification. Iran has not allowed international inspectors to establish the current status and location of its stockpiles of uranium enriched close to weapons grade since June 2025, when Israel and the United States attacked major elements of the country’s nuclear infrastructure.
The lack of access means that the International Atomic Energy Agency cannot independently establish what happened to the material that Iran had accumulated before the attacks, where it is currently stored or whether all of it remains under effective monitoring. That uncertainty is particularly important because highly enriched uranium can be a critical component in any future effort to develop a nuclear weapon.
“Brak inspektorów na miejscu i brak wglądu w sytuację to kolejny poziom łamania zobowiązań, co budzi poważny niepokój” powiedział Wright.
The issue is now also being discussed at the IAEA’s annual General Conference. Last week, the United States requested that Iran’s nuclear case once again be referred to the United Nations Security Council. The IAEA Board of Governors subsequently moved to refer the issue to the Security Council, increasing diplomatic pressure on Tehran. (Financial Buddy)
The lack of inspections also makes it harder to determine whether Iran has moved nuclear material or sensitive equipment to facilities that are more difficult to reach. This is one of the reasons why underground sites have become increasingly important in the dispute.
New activity at Pickaxe Mountain
One of the most closely watched locations is Pickaxe Mountain, a heavily fortified underground facility near Natanz. The site has attracted attention because of its depth and because Iran has previously indicated that sensitive nuclear infrastructure could be moved underground to protect it from military attacks.
IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi confirmed last week that the agency had detected new activity around the site using remote imagery. However, the agency has not been able to inspect the underground complex itself, meaning it cannot establish what is actually taking place inside.
“Istnieją pewne przesłanki wskazujące na ruchy w pobliżu tego placu budowy” powiedział Grossi.
“Nie dysponujemy jednak konkretnymi informacjami na temat działań, które mogą być tam prowadzone” dodał.
The distinction is important. Satellite imagery and other remote observations can show construction activity, vehicles, road movements or changes around the facility, but they cannot by themselves establish whether Iran is enriching uranium inside the mountain. Recent analysis by the Center for Strategic and International Studies found a significant increase in construction activity at Pickaxe Mountain in 2026, while also stressing that available imagery cannot confirm that centrifuges have been moved there or that enrichment is taking place. (CSIS)
The facility is particularly difficult to monitor because the IAEA has never been granted direct access to the underground complex. That leaves the agency dependent on remote information and means that one of the most sensitive questions surrounding Iran’s nuclear program remains unresolved.
The United States also has a problem with its own nuclear fuel
Washington’s proposal to supply Iran with nuclear fuel is also linked to a broader problem facing the US nuclear industry. The United States remains heavily dependent on imported uranium products needed to fuel the reactors that generate roughly one fifth of the country’s electricity. (Arcamax E-Zine)
Wright said the United States is close to strengthening its own uranium supply chain. The Department of Energy is finalizing agreements related to long term uranium production and partnerships, although the administration has not yet provided details about the arrangements.
That creates an important background to the Iranian proposal. Washington is seeking to persuade Tehran to give up domestic enrichment while at the same time rebuilding its own capacity to secure the nuclear fuel required by its civilian nuclear sector. The US therefore wants greater control over the supply chain while limiting the number of countries that possess sensitive enrichment capabilities.
For Iran, accepting American supplied fuel would mean giving up part of its current nuclear infrastructure in exchange for access to an external supply system. The central question would be whether Tehran would consider those guarantees sufficiently reliable to abandon domestic enrichment permanently.
The stakes go beyond Iran’s nuclear program
The dispute is no longer limited to the technical question of how much uranium Iran has enriched. It concerns the entire architecture of the country’s nuclear program, including centrifuges, underground facilities, access for international inspectors and the ability to verify where nuclear material is located.
The renewed attention to Pickaxe Mountain has made the verification problem even more serious. The IAEA has confirmed activity around the site, but does not have concrete information about what is happening inside. Independent satellite analysis likewise shows intensified construction but cannot establish whether the facility is being prepared for uranium enrichment. (CSIS)
This leaves diplomacy facing a difficult equation. The United States wants Iran to abandon enrichment and its centrifuge program, while offering access to externally supplied nuclear fuel. Iran would have to accept restrictions on one of the most strategically important parts of its nuclear infrastructure and trust that external fuel supplies would remain available in the future.
At the same time, the lack of inspections and the continued development of heavily protected underground facilities increase the risk that any future agreement could be based on incomplete information. The more difficult it becomes for inspectors to establish what Iran possesses and where it is located, the harder it will be to distinguish between a civilian nuclear program and infrastructure that could support a future military capability.
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